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The year 310 B.C. witnessed the extinction of the Argead line. Cassander had ordered 
the murder of Young Alexander IV and his mother Roxane, widow of Alexander the 
Great. The kingdom of Macedonia was now without a king. Cassander’s deed cleared 
the way for the ambitious dynasts who controlled the armies and lands of the eastern 
Mediterranean. Yet no one stepped forth to claim the crown. The throne lay vacant for 
four years. In 306 the situation changed in dramatic fashion. Antigonus 
Monophthalmus took the title of King, and a chain reaction followed. Within a short 
span of time, Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander all acquired the same title. 
The Hellenistic world which had had no monarch for half a decade suddenly had a 
plethora of them. But what kind of monarchy, how viewed and how justified? The 
matter is important. It helped give shape to the age of Alexander’s Successors. 
A consensus prevails on the subject. Antigonus, it is affirmed, conceived the nature 
of his kingship in a manner very different from that of his rivals. His realm would be 
co-extensive with the empire of Alexander, a universal monarchy that would permit no 
challengers. Those who declined to acknowledge his supremacy would be treated as 
rebels and enemies. By contrast, the other diadochoi held a more modest notion of 
royalty. They were content with portions of what had once been Alexander’s dominion, 
each asserting regal privileges within definable territories, whether Egypt, Asia, Thrace, 
or Macedon. On this analysis, Antigonus may have been the worthiest of Alexander’s 
Successors and most faithful to his aspirations, but the other dynasts had a clearer vision 
of the future of the Hellenistic world1. Yet a closer examination gives pause. The 
sources on assumption of the royal title by the diadochoi offer no hint that the new kings 
had radically different conceptions of its meanings2. The issue warrants renewed 
scrutiny. 
The execution of Alexander IV was accomplished quietly and secretly. How long it 
remained a secret is unknown. But the news, once reported, stirred hardly a ripple. The 
dynasts neither grieved nor complained3. The silence of Antigonus One-Eyed is 
especially surprising. He had been vociferous in condemning Cassander earlier for the 
                                                          
* Originally published in GRUEN 1985. Published in Karanos by kind permission of the author. 
This paper originated in a graduate seminar in Berkeley, with special gratitude due to the participation 
of R. Billows, F. De Rose, W. Greenwalt, and J. Scholten. The present version has had the benefit of 
remarks and suggestions by W. L. Adams, E. N. Borza, and S. M. Burstein. 
1 This interpretation, or some variant thereof, is widely shared. See, e.g., GRANIER 1931, 101-103; 
AYMARD 1967, 94; 119-120; MANNI 1952, 29-30; 105-106; WILL 1966, I, 64-65; FORTINA 1965, 94-95; 
RITTER 1965, 93-94; MUSTI 1966, 95; MÜLLER 1973, 88-90; 100-101; 105-107; HAUBEN 1974, 105-106.  
2 Fullest testimony in Plut. Demtr. 17.2-18.1. Briefer versions in Diod. 20.53.1-2; Heid. Epit. = FGrH, 
155 F 1.7; Appian. Syr. 54; Justin. 15.2.10; Oros. 3.23.40. Confused and inaccurate statements in Nepos. 
Eum. 13.2-3, and I Macc. 1.7-9. 
3 Diod. 19.105.2-3; Trog. Prol. 15; Justin. 15.2.4-5; Paus. 9.72. 
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mistreatment of Roxane and her son4. Their assassination, however, left him dumb. 
None of the diadochoi issued a protest. Cassander undoubtedly denied the deed. There 
were always others to blame. Diodorus postulates a great sense of relief on the part of 
Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Antigonus, and Cassander: they no longer need fear that 
Alexander IV would reach majority, and each could entertain royal ambitions for 
himself, while holding the territory under his control as a spear-won kingdom. The 
historian’s analysis is anticipatory and conjectural. In fact, the dynasts made no move 
toward claiming the titles and prerogatives of a king5. All had professed loyalty to the 
Argead house to that point. To usurp kingly office would be more than unseemly; it 
would deny their own propaganda and undermine their credibility. Moreover, the 
appeal of the Argead dynasty remained high in Greece and Macedon. The effort to place 
Heracles, supposed son of Alexander by an Iranian mistress, on the throne demonstrates 
that clearly enough6. So does the scramble to seek the hand of Cleopatra, sister of 
Alexander the Great – a scramble that precipitated her execution in 3087. The diadochoi 
wisely refrained from pressing any public claims on the inheritance of Alexander. An 
anomalous situation ensued: the empire had no ruler. Yet the dynasts, the armies, and 
the inhabitants of what had been Alexander’s realm could evidently live with that 
situation. They had done so de facto, of course, ever since the death of Alexander in 
323. But none was yet prepared to do so de iure. Babylonian and Egyptian records, 
indeed, continued to count the regnal years of Alexander IV for several years after his 
death8. That comforting fiction covered the interlude and provided a temporary screen 
for reality. New circumstances and new justifications were required to permit an open 
break with the tradition of Argead rule. 
Conflicts among the leaders persisted, and renewed hostilities soon made a shambles 
of the peace of 311, to which they had affixed their signatures. No need to rehearse the 
events here. Only one item is of direct relevance: the first major military victory by any 
of the dynasts since the death of Alexander IV in 306. And that victory changed 
everything. 
A great naval battle off Salamis in Cyprus seemed to hold world supremacy itself in 
the balance9. The account overdramatizes. But the victor certainly sought to portray it 
in that light. The forces of Antigonus, led by his dynamic son Demetrius Poliorcetes, 
smashed the Ptolemaic fleet at Salamis and gained a decisive triumph. Ptolemy lost 120 
warships and another 100 transports, in addition to several thousand soldiers captured 
or surrendered. All of Cyprus was lost, and Ptolemy returned ignominiously to Egypt10. 
The Antigonid cause took a significant jump in prestige and power. 
                                                          
4 Diod. 19.61.1; Justin. 15.1.3; cf. Diod. 19.52.4. 
5 Diod. 19.105.3-4: οὐκέτι γὰρ ὄντος οὐδενὸς τοῦ διαδεξομένου τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ λοιπὸν ἕκαστος τῶν 
κρατούντων ἐθνῶν ἢ πόλεων βασιλικὰς εἶχεν ἐλπίδας καὶ τὴν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τεταγμένην χώραν εἶχεν ὡσανεί 
τινα βασιλείαν δορίκτητον. On the concept of “spear-won territory” see SCHMITTHENNER 1968, 31-39; 
MÜLLER 1973, 116-121; MEHL 1980-81, 187-196. Diodorus may well have found the phrase in 
Hieronymus of Cardia; HORNBLOWER 1981, 53. The hailing of Antigonus as king and lord of Asia by 
those dwelling in Persis came on their initiative, not his; Diod. 19.48.1. And Antigonus refrained from 
adopting the appellation. 
6 Diod. 20.20.1-4, 20.28.1-4; Justin, 15.2.3. On the strength of support for this effort, see, especially, 
Diod. 20.20.3-4, 20.28.1. 
7 Diod. 20.37.3-6. 
8 See GRAYSON 1975, 118-119; SKEAT 1954, 9. 
9 Plut. Demetr. 15.3: ὡς οὐ Κύπρον οὐδὲ Συρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγιστον εὐθὺς εἶναι πάντων τῷ κρατοῦντι τῆς 
νίκης προστιθείσης. 
10 Sources on the battle: Diod. 20.47-52; Plut. Demetr. 15-16; Justin, 15.2.6; Polyaen. 4.76. See the 
discussion by SEIBERT 1969, 190-206. 
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What followed carried still greater significance. Antigonus Monophthalmus was at 
Antigoneia on the Orontes, there supervising the plans for this new city which was to 
be his capital11. The dynast eagerly awaited word of the contest in Cyprus. Plutarch tells 
the tale in its fullest form. Having achieved victory, Demetrius selected a trusted officer, 
Aristodemus of Miletus, to deliver the news to his father. Aristodemus landed alone, 
leaving the crew aboard ship and keeping the outcome of the battle a secret. His journey 
to Antigonus’ quarters was slow and deliberate, thus to intensify the suspense. Anxious 
messengers from Antigonus met him en route but were turned away without a word. 
Aristodemus’ solemn pace and stony silence increased the anxiety, and growing 
numbers swelled his entourage as he approached the residence of Antigonus. Only upon 
arrival there and direct encounter with the dynast did Aristodemus present his 
announcement. And he began with a startling address: “Hail, king Antigonus”. It was 
the first time such a salutation had been offered to Monophthalmus. Aristodemus then 
reported the magnitude of the victory at Salamis, and the gathering took its cue: they 
declared both Antigonus and Demetrius as kings. A ceremony of sorts followed 
immediately thereupon. The friends of Antigonus crowned him, and the new ruler sent 
off a diadem to his son, accompanied by a letter which greeted him as king12. The 
Antigonids had now openly proclaimed a new monarchy. 
How does one interpret the event? It can on no account be reckoned as spontaneous 
– or as the flourish of a flatterer. The sequence of developments precludes such 
inferences: Aristodemus’ slow and silent march that heightened tensions, the collecting 
of a crowd, Antigonus’ personal appearance, the messenger’s striking address, the 
immediate acclamation of the kings, the award of the diadem. Only one conclusion is 
possible: the whole affair was staged. Antigonus had already learned of the outcome of 
Salamis. And he had the time to orchestrate a drama which would culminate in his 
coronation13. 
The means of legitimizing this move, however, remain very much in dispute. 
Salutation by the army, it has been argued, played a role, authorizing or ratifying 
Antigonus’ elevation14. Or else the φίλοι of Antigonus, acting as a form of συνέδριον, 
conferred legitimacy when they crowned the king15. Or else the coronation ceremony 
anticipated the future installation of Hellenistic monarchs through formal presentation 
to the populace16. Yet a search for constitutional precedent or a rite of investiture takes 
precisely the wrong approach. No army assembly gave sanction to the kingship of 
Antigonus Monophthalmus. Only Appian, among our sources, specifies a declaration 
by the army – and he sets it in Cyprus where the soldiers hailed both Antigonus and 
Demetrius. That deed, however, if it occurred at all, has no relevance for the formal 
assumption of royalty. Demetrius, as we know, received his kingly authority only 
through dispatch of the diadem by his father. Any acclamation by soldiers would lack 
                                                          
11 Diod. 20.47.5. 
12 Plut. Demetr. 17.2-18.1. The story presents Aristodemus as the most notorious of Antigonus’ flatterers 
and this episode as the most extreme of his flatteries. And he also gets his comeuppance. Antigonus 
berates him for generating the anxieties and prolonging the agony: he will have to wait a long time for 
any reward. Aristodemus’ actions are plainly misinterpreted and distorted by Plutarch’s source. He was, 
in fact, a high-ranking, trusted, and respected officer of Antigonus -one who had served him long and 
well; cf. KIRCHNER 1895, 923-24 n. 16; SCHOCH 1924, 47 n. 16. MÜLLER 1973, 80-81, suggests that 
Plutarch drew on a source which collected anecdotes on flatterers. 
13 The manipulative character of the affair has often been recognized; GRANIER1931, 99; RITTER 1965, 
84; BRIANT 1973, 307-310; MÜLLER1973, 87-93; ERRINGTON 1978, 123-125. 
14 GRANIER1931, 98-101; RITTER 1965, 79-82, 89-91; MÜLLER 1973, 81-87. 
15 RITTER 1965, 82-89. 
16 BRIANT 1973, 307-109; endorsed by SEIBERT 1983, 138. 
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juridical significance17. The same holds for the involvement of the φίλοι. Nothing in 
Macedonian tradition gave them official status18. And to regard the crowning of 
Antigonus as an elaborate ceremony, itself designed to set a precedent for future 
investitures, goes well beyond our testimony. Among other matters, it overlooks 
Demetrius’ acquisition of the royal title without ceremony or ritual. He needed only a 
letter and the diadem delivered by couriers. The entire episode is marked by measures 
tailored for the particular occasion – not governed by standard practice or dependent on 
constitutional theory. 
Novelty rather than tradition stands out here. Antigonus made no appeal to the past, 
relied on no fixed conventions, called upon no predecessors to legitimize his 
ascendancy. Only his own accomplishments counted. In particular, the most recent 
accomplishment. The victory at Salamis broke the stalemate and shot Antigonus to a 
position of clear superiority, at least for the moment. Antigonus shattered the 
conspiracy of silence over the absence of kingship. Decisive triumph, it was claimed, 
proved his quality. Salamis alone justified royalty. On that the texts are consistent19. 
Modern assumptions to the contrary, Antigonus did not project himself as heir to 
Alexander the Great or continuator of the Argead dynasty20. This monarchy would take 
on a new character: a “personal” or “charismatic” monarchy, as it is often called21. But 
it was more than that. Antigonus created a new dynasty – explicitly and overtly. The 
assembled throng, no doubt carefully primed and prompted, greeted both Antigonus 
and Demetrius as kings. The father held precedence: he sent the diadem to Demetrius, 
and he was responsible for the conferring of royal privileges22. But a dynastic scheme 
had been set in place. The association of Demetrius in his rule allowed Antigonus to 
convey a sense of stability and endurance. The charisma of the victor authorized the 
                                                          
17 The account in Appian Syr. 54 is brief and, very possibly, foreshortened: ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳ λαμπροτάτῳ 
γενομένῳ (the battle of Salamis) ὁ στρατὸς ἀνεῖπεν ἄμφω βασιλέας. No other source accords any role to 
the army. Plutarch has τὸ πλῆθος, salute father and son as kings (Demetr. 18.1). The term can be used to 
designate the army, but not inevitably so. In Plutarch’s narrative here it is much more naturally taken as 
the assemblage that had gathered before Antigonus’ residence and reacted joyously to Aristodemus’ 
hailing of Antigonus as king (Demetr. 17.5-18.1). That Plutarch previously characterized the crowd as 
ὄχλος (17.4) is irrelevant. He does not employ technical language here. Notice that Justin, 15.2.10, has 
the acclamation performed, on Antigonus’ orders, by the populus. BRIANT 1973, 303-10, rightly rejects 
the notion of the Heeresversammlung. But he substitutes a schematic series of steps: acclamation by the 
troops in Cyprus, a coronation at Antigoneia, and instructions to the people to regard father and son as 
kings. 
18 The council at Babylon in 323 is not a proper parallel. That was impromptu procedure. The nobles 
debated and expected to determine Alexander’s successor by designating a member of the Argead house. 
In 306, however, there were no Argeads and all the φίλοι were φίλοι of Antigonus. More important, the 
φίλοι did not determine the king. They acted only after the rulers had been proclaimed by τὸ πλῆθος; 
Plut. Demetr. 18.1. RITTER’s view (1965, 82-89), that the army hailed Antigonus as king of Macedon 
and the φίλοι crowned him as ruler of Asia, is fanciful. 
19 Diod. 20.53.2: ὁ δ᾽ Ἀντίγονος πυθόμενος τὴν γεγενημένην νίκην καὶ μετεωρισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ 
προτερήματος διάδημα περιέθετο καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐχρημάτιζε βασιλεύς; Plut. Demetr. 17.5 (Aristodemus 
speaking): ‘χαῖρε, βασιλεῦ Ἀντίγονε, νικῶμεν Πτολεμαῖον ναυμαχίᾳ καὶ Κύπρον ἔχομεν καὶ στρατιώτας 
αἰχμαλώτους μυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους ὀκτακοσίους; Appian, Syr. 54, quoted above, n. 17; Justin, 15.2.10: 
hac victoria elatus Antigonus regem se cum Demetrio filio appellari a populo iubet. Cf. The brief but 
trenchant remarks of WEHRLI 1968, 61. 
20 As is asserted, for example, by CLOCHÉ 1959, 194; RITTER 1965, 84; MÜLLER 1973, 91-93. The 
arguments of EDSON 1934, 213-26, that the Antigonids and Argeads did have a familial connection, are 
highly speculative. 
21 Cf. KAERST 1926-27, II, 331; WEHRLI 1968, 61; MÜLLER 1973, 86-87, 92, 108-21 –though he also 
lays stress on formal ratification or legitimization of the position. 
22 Plut. Demetr. 18.1: Δημητρίῳ δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔπεμψε διάδημα καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν βασιλέα προσεῖπεν. 
Cf. Diod. 20.53.2: συγχωρήσας καὶ τῷ Δημητρίῳ τῆς αὐτῆς τυγχάνειν προσηγορίας καὶ τιμῆς. 
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elevation. The event, however, exceeded personal triumph. Inclusion of Demetrius 
announced a dynastic regime that would fill the gap left by the demise of the Argeads23. 
Antigonus did not present his rule as continuous with predecessors or as founded upon 
precedent. This was to be a new order and a new monarchy. It combined charisma and 
dynasty. 
Antigonus Monophthalmus set a precedent rather than followed one. The other 
diadochoi son insisted upon royal titles for themselves – a fact that Antigonus must 
have anticipated. How Swift and under what circumstances they did so remains subject 
to debate and uncertainty. The literary sources are largely in accord: the coronation of 
Ptolemy followed shortly upon Antigonus’ proclamation, and those of Seleucus, 
Lysimachus, and Cassander not long thereafter. And there is unanimity on the motive 
for so rapid a response, at least with regard to Ptolemy: he would not allow his stature 
to be diminished by defeat and thus took the kingship, lest he be thought dispirited or 
inferior to his rival24. That testimony, however, evokes suspicion, both as to fact and to 
interpretation. 
Ptolemy’s situation needs a closer look. The supposed motive is implausible. 
Antigonus justified his coronation by pointing to military success as a sign of kingly 
quality and divine favor. Ptolemy could hardly claim the same distinction in order to 
compensate for defeat, an act that would only call attention to his weakness25. 
Unanimity among our authorities is here indecisive, for it involves assessment of 
motive rather than presentation of fact. And the similarity of statements suggests that 
all may have drawn ultimately on a single source26. Other evidence outside the literary 
tradition puts matters in a rather different light. Ptolemy, it seems clear, did not assume 
royalty as a swift and direct response to Antigonus’ move. The chronological canon of 
Claudius Ptolemaeus sets the first year of Ptolemy’s reign in 305/4. By Egyptian 
reckoning that signifies accession some time between November 7, 305 and November 
6, 30427. The date can be further narrowed by the evidence of the Marmor Parium which 
puts Ptolemy’s taking of the crown in the Attic year 305/4, that is, between July 4, 305 
and July 3, 30428. Further specification comes from two demotic papyri, the last 
documents dated by the regnal years of Alexander IV: they belong in the Egyptian 
month of Hathyr in 305/4, which runs from January 6 to February 4, 30429. The 
combined testimony yields an accession date some time between January and July, 
30430. As is obvious, the declaration of Antigonus, probably in spring of 306, did not 
trigger the response of Ptolemy – which came two years later31. The chronology also 
                                                          
23 ERRINGTON 1978, 124-125, goes too far in suggesting that Antigonus hit upon this scheme to shore up 
the weakness and insecurity of his own position. 
24 Diod. 20.53.3: Closely comparable statements in Plut. Demetr. 18.1; Appian Syr. 54; Heid. Epit. = 
FGrH 155 F 1.7; Justin. 15.2.11: Ptolomeus quoque, ne minoris apud suos auctoritatis haberetur, rex ab 
exercitu cognominatur. 
25 The effort of RITTER 1965, 98-99, to defend the sources’ interpretation here is singularly unsuccessful. 
26 So, rightly, MÜLLER1973, 94. 
27 SKEAT 1954, 2-4, 28. 
28 FGrH 239 B 23. Cf. Porphyry, FGrH 260 F 21. 
29 P. Dem. Louvre, 2427, 2440; cf. VOLKMANN 1959, 1621 n. 18. 
30 SAMUEL 1962, 4-11, seeks to push it back to November 7, 305, to coincide with the beginning of the 
Egyptian year. The demotic papyri are explained by the length of time required for the news of Ptolemy’s 
coronation to reach Upper Egypt. The thesis does not compel assent. It assumes that the last extant 
documents of Alexander IV’s reign were, in fact, the last produced, a hazardous assumption. They 
supply, of course, only a terminus post quem. MÜLLER 1973, 97-100, expresses appropriate reservations 
about Samuel’s arguments but ends by adopting his position anyway. A bibliographical summary on the 
subject by SEIBERT 1983, 139-140. 
31 On the date of Salamis, which prompted Antigonos’ declaration, see MÜLLER 1973, 79. 
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rules out what might seem to have been an appropriate occasion: Ptolemy’s successful 
resistance to the Antigonid assault on Egypt in late 306, resistance that forced an 
embarrassing retreat by his enemies32. Elation followed that triumph. Ptolemy 
celebrated with a public ceremony of thanks to the gods and a lavish entertainment for 
friends, and then fired off letters to Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander, announcing 
his victory and the heavy losses of Antigonus33. Yet he still withheld any regal 
acclamations. More than a year would pass before he took that step. The trumpeting of 
victory perhaps laid the groundwork, but Ptolemy refrained from offending potential 
allies by jumping the gun. 
A further setback for Antigonus may have given Ptolemy the incentive to grasp the 
kingship: the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes by Demetrius Poliorcetes. Ptolemy provided 
substantial aid, both men and supplies, in support of Rhodes’ struggle34. The islanders 
expressed gratitude in extravagant fashion. On advice from the oracle of Ammon, they 
gave Ptolemy honors due to a god35. The siege of Rhodes began probably in the spring 
of 305, and lasted approximately a year36. Ptolemy may have accepted elevation to 
monarchy during that period – or, better still, at its conclusion, when his stature had 
risen markedly and royal privileges could be added to divine honors37. In any case, the 
new ruler claimed his prerogatives to underscore success, not to mitigate defeat. 
Comparable success provided opportunity and occasion for Seleucus to style himself 
as king. Diodorus places his decision in the context of recovering control over the Upper 
Satrapies38. Seleucus had previously dealt with Asiatics as a monarch, so Plutarch 
reports, but now donned the diadem in treating with Greeks as well39. When Seleucus 
officially took the royal title can be determined within limits. A Babylonian king – list 
puts his first year as ruler in the seventh year of the Seleucid era, i.e. from March to 
March, 305/440. Confirmation comes from the earliest Babylonian document dated by 
Seleucus’ reign: April 16, 30441. Hence, Seleucus, like Ptolemy, accepted the crown 
nearly two years after the Antigonids had done so. For him too the designation 
advertised accomplishment and proclaimed ability. 
The accession dates of Lysimachus and Cassander remain unknown. Lysimachus, it 
can be inferred, did not lag long behind Ptolemy and Seleucus – if at all. Once news 
                                                          
32 Diod. 20.73-76; Plut. Demetr. 19.1-2; Paus. 1.6.6. Antigonos undertook the invasion in early 
November, 306; Diod. 20.73.3. 
33 Diod. 20.76.6-7. 
34 Diod. 20.88.9, 20.94.3, 20.96.1, 20.98.1, 20.99.2. 
35 Diod. 20.100.3-4. 
36 Diod. 20.100.1. 
37 The possibility that Ptolemy’s kingship began after the siege of Rhodes has not previously been 
considered, though there is no decisive evidence against it. Note, especially, the testimony of the Marmor 
Parium, FGrH 239 B 23: ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ Ῥόδον πολιορκίας, καὶ ἀφ’ ο[ὗ Πτ]ολεμαῖος τὴν βασιλείαν 
πα̣ρ[έ]λ[α]β[εν...]. It can be objected that Seleucus became king by April, 304 (see below), and that 
Ptolemy’s proclamation preceded his. The objection is not decisive. The sources which place Ptolemy’s 
coronation before the others’ also set them all immediately after Antigonus’ declaration – which is 
demonstrably false; Plut. Demetr. 18.2; Appian. Syr. 54. 
38 Diod. 20.53.4: Σέλευκος μὲν προσφάτως τὰς ἄνω σατραπείας προσκεκτημένος. 
39 Plut. Demetr. 18.2: καὶ γὰρ Λυσίμαχος ἤρξατο φορεῖν διάδημα, καὶ Σέλευκος ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς 
Ἕλλησιν, ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε βαρβάροις πρότερον οὗτος ὡς βασιλεὺς ἐχρημάτιζε. RITTER’s argument (1965, 
100-101), that Seleucus wore the diadem with Asiatics earlier, but was not king until 305/4 strains the 
evidence. He is obliged, among other things, to read οὕτως, instead of οὗτος without good reason. Cf. 
MUSTI 1966, 86-87. And since, as Seleucus must have known, Asiatics would regard the wearer of the 
diadem as king (indeed, perhaps, urged it upon him), the distinction seems pointless. 
40 SACHS – WISEMAN 1954, 205. 
41 PARKER – DUBBERSTEIN 1942, 18. 
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spread that certain dynasts arrogated royal titles to themselves, he could hardly have 
settled for lesser distinctions. Cassander waited rather longer, perhaps wary of 
Macedonian sensitivity regarding the Argead house and unsure of loyalties in the 
realm42. But he too yielded to temptation, possibly after shoring up support to confront 
Demetrius in 303/2. Cassander soon designated himself on bronze coinage and 
epigraphic documents as “king of the Macedonians”43. The maintenance of Prestige 
demanded the label of monarch. The Hellenistic world in short order had obtained five 
kings44. 
The central question can now be addressed. How did the diadochoi and their 
followers perceive these monarchies? Did Antigonus alone visualize his realm as 
encompassing the empire of Alexander, an imposing but unrealistic ambition, while his 
rivals contented themselves with more strictly defined territorial kingdoms, the real 
harbingers of the future? 
Our texts on the assumption of kingship by Antigonus’ rivals betray no suggestion 
that their view of its meaning differed from his. Quite the contrary. They explain the 
actions of the diadochoi specifically as emulation of Antigonus, lest they be considered 
inferior to him45. A conception of their rule as bounded by territorial confines would be 
a gratuitous admission of inferiority. Self-effacement or restraint rarely characterized 
the actions of the diadochoi. Whence then derives this idea that Antigonus had a more 
exalted notion of his rule than did his rivals of theirs, an idea shared by so many 
scholars?46 A single anecdote is cited repeatedly as buttress for this conclusion. 
                                                          
42 The Heidelberg Epitome, notably, omits Cassander when listing the dynasts who took the diadem and 
royal title after Antigonus and Demetrius; FGrH 55 F 1.7. Plut. Demetr. 18.2 lends confirmation: 
Cassander did not employ the royal title in his correspondence, although the other diadochoi used it in 
addressing him. The rest of the sources fail to draw that distinction; Diod. 20.53.4; Appian, Syr. 54; 
Justin, 15.2.12; Nepos, Eum. 13.3. 
43 His bronze coinage displays the designation ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ; HEAD 1887, 228. And he 
labels himself in epigraphic documents as βασιλεὺς Μακεδόνων; Dittenberg. SIG, 332; and a new statue 
base from Dium, recently announced; PANDERMALIS1977, 16: ‘ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝ[ΩΝ] 
ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΣ ΑΝΤΙΠ[ΑΤΡΟΥ] ΔΙΙ ΟΛΥΜΠΙΩΙ. AYMARD 1967, 102-106, 120, wrongly regards the 
designation as official titulature of Macedonian royalty. But ERRINGTON’s argument (1974, 23-25), on 
the basis of Plut. Demetr. 18.27 that it was quite exceptional, is equally unpersuasive. His notion that 
Cassander used the title for internal consumption but avoided it in foreign policy is difficult to credit. If 
Cassander were willing to assert his legitimacy within Macedon, why should he shrink from that posture 
in dealings with the diadochoi? So peculiar a sense of modesty could only diminish his international 
stature. In the view of MÜLLER 1973, 103-104, Plutarch’s information is a confused reference to rejection 
of the diadem by Cassander. But that solution, wholly speculative, fails to explain the text. ADAMS 1983, 
25-26, rightly sees that Cassander delayed his coronation, though he gives too much weight to 
“constitutional restraints”. But Adams’ suggested date (after Ipsus) is implausible – a view he has more 
recently modified in private correspondence. Cassander needed the stature which would put him on a 
level of equality with allies in resistance to the Antigonids in 303/2; cf. Diod. 20.106.2-107.1. 
44 MÜLLER 1973, 102-103, takes summer of 304 as terminus ante quem for this development, on the basis 
of Diod. 20.100.2: Rhodes, after the end of her siege, erected statues to “the kings Cassander and 
Lysimachus”. But it is risky to assume that that information stems from inscriptions on the bases of the 
statues. Diodorus may simply be maintaining internal consistency: he had placed all the royal 
acclamations shortly after Antigonus’ initiative; Diod. 20.53.2-4; cf. RITTER 1965, 107 n. 5. Lesser 
dynasts and tyrants evidently also took the name of king in the last years of the fourth century; for 
example, Agathocles of Syracuse; Diod. 20.54.1; Dionysius of Heraclea Pontica; Memnon, FGrH 3B 
434 F 4.6; Eumelus of the Bosporan kingdom; see BRANDIS 1894, 761-762; GEYER 1929, 1542. 
45 Diod. 20.53.4: καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δυνάσται ζηλοτυπήσαντες ἀνηγόρευον ἑαυτοὺς βασιλεῖς; Plut. Demetr. 
18.2: ἐπενείματο δὲ οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ ζήλῳ τοὺς διαδόχους; Heid. Epit. = FGrH 155 F 1.7: ἰδόντες 
δέ καὶ οι ἑτεροι, οσοι οὐκ ἠλαττοῦντο αὐτοῦ, εφόρεσαν κἀκεῖνοι διάδημα καὶ ὠνόμασαν έαυτούς 
βασιλεῖς. 
46 See above n. 1. 
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Demetrius Poliorcetes, as the tale has it, ridiculed those who called anyone but himself 
and his father king, and heard with pleasure those who toasted him as monarch, while 
giving mock-titles to his rivals: Seleucus the master of elephants, Ptolemy the naval 
lord, Lysimachus the treasurer, and Agathocles the island-ruler47. On the face of it, that 
seems strong testimony for Antigonus’ vision of an empire ruled by his house alone, 
with no room for rivals. 
Closer scrutiny causes hesitation. The anecdote concerns Demetrius, not Antigonus. 
Revelers at a banquet and flatterers eager to please hardly represent official policy – 
any more than does Demetrius himself when boasting or bantering in his cups. And 
when did this episode occur? Plutarch appears to put it shortly after the Antigonid 
revival of the League of Corinth in 302, thus inducing most scholars to assign that year 
to the event48. But the inference is delusive. Plutarch quite clearly transmits the 
anecdote in an excursus. Demetrius’ appointment as hegemon of the League gave the 
biographer occasion to speak of his excessive self-laudation: he even regarded himself 
as superior to Philip and Alexander; whereas Alexander addressed other rulers as kings, 
Demetrius would put none on a par with himself. The anecdote then follows, evidently 
independent of any chronology. That Plutarch presents it as a digression is plain 
enough. He signals the fact unambiguously when he returns to the narrative: τότε δὲ49. 
Other chronological indicators point to a later date. Most particularly, the absence of 
Cassander from the tale suggests a time after the dynast’s death in 298/7. A toast in 302 
which derided Demetrius’ adversaries but omitted Cassander, his principal antagonist 
in Greece, would make little sense50. The phraseology in one version of the anecdote is 
even more striking: the flatterers toasted Δημητρίου μὲν μόνον βασιλέως51. That will 
not fit easily into the lifetime of Antigonus Monophthalmus. Still another clue lends 
support: the inclusion of Agathocles of Syracuse as among the targets of Demetrius’ 
flatterers. At what point would Agathocles have sufficiently impressed Demetrius to 
warrant a position among the other dynasts? Surely not before his successful campaign 
at Corcyra ca. 299, and probably not before the marriage of his daughter to Pyrrhus in 
29552. The evidence is consistent enough. Demetrius’ mockery of his adversaries, even 
if it were more than a tipsy toast, occurred some time in the 290s and is inadmissible as 
evidence for Antigonus’ attitude toward his monarchy53. 
                                                          
47 Plut. Demetr. 25.4: ἐκεῖνος [Demetrius] δὲ χλευάζων καὶ γελῶν τοὺς ἄλλον τινὰ πλὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ 
αὐτοῦ βασιλέα προσαγορεύοντας, ἡδέως ἤκουε τῶν παρὰ πότον ἐπιχύσεις λαμβανόντων Δημητρίου 
βασιλέως, Σελεύκου δὲ ἐλεφαντάρχου, Πτολεμαίου δὲ ναυάρχου, Λυσιμάχου δὲ γαζοφύλακος, 
Ἀγαθοκλέους δὲ τοῦ Σικελιώτου νησιάρχου. The same anecdote reappears in Plut. Mor. 823c-d. 
Athenaeus gives a nearly identical version, for which he cites Phylarchus, but which omits Agathocles; 
Athen. 6.261b = FGrH 81 F 31. 
48 Plut. Demetr. 25.3-4. 
49 Plut. Demetr. 26.1. 
50 MÜLLER 1973, 89, argues that Demetrius’ flatterers left out Cassander precisely because he was the 
most hated rival. That needs no refutation. Similarly implausible is the suggestion of HAUBEN 1974, 112, 
that Cassander seemed less formidable than the other dynasts and was therefore ignored by Demetrius’ 
circle. He had certainly not been ignored by Demetrius himself. 
51 The version of Phylarchus, in Athen. 6.261b = FGrH 81 F 31. 
52 The campaign at Corcyra; Diod. 21.2; the marriage alliance with Pyrrhus: Plut. Pyrrh. 9.1; Diod. 21.4. 
Agathocles’ own marriage to Theoxena from Egypt might indicate a connection with Ptolemy; Justin, 
23.2.6. But that marriage itself is almost certainly no earlier than ca. 300; WILL 1966, I, 103; SEIBERT 
1967, 73-74. 
53 To be sure, Plutarch’s version of the anecdote in the Life of Demetrius has Demetrius berate those who 
give the name of king to anyone but himself and his father; Plut. Demetr. 25.4. That need not, however, 
imply that Antigonus was alive at the time. Demetrius simply asserted the monopoly of his line on that 
distinction. The argument of HAUBEN 1974, 108, that Seleucus would not have been called 
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On that attitude, a better piece of testimony survives. Plutarch reports that Cassander 
refrained from calling himself King in letters to the other diadochoi, even though they 
employed the title in correspondence and direct contact with him54. The passage is often 
discussed with regard to Cassander’s kingship. But it has larger implications. The other 
monarchs who addressed Cassander as βασιλεύς included Antigonus Monophthalmus. 
The fact needs to be underscored. Antigonus, by acknowledging the royalty of his 
competitors, conceded that his concept of kingship did not entail exclusivity55. 
What reason is there to believe that Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander 
perceived their royal prerogatives as tied to territorially bounded kingdoms? Certainly 
none of the first three identified himself in such fashion. No Greek document or coin 
proclaims Ptolemy as king of Egypt or Seleucus as ruler of Babylon – or indeed as ruler 
of Asia. And Lysimachus, eager to attract the loyalty of Greeks and Macedonians, 
would hardly style himself as “King of Thrace”. Cassander alone stands as apparent 
exception. He did adopt the title “King of the Macedonians” on bronze coins and in 
inscriptions56. But the exception is only apparent. Cassander, it should be observed 
projected himself as ruler of the Macedonians, not of Macedon. The designation 
exceeds territorial limits Cassander was king of the Macedonians as Alexander had 
been – at least in principle. And there were many Macedonians outside the borders of 
Macedon57. 
The others too ruled Macedonians. To reckon themselves as kings of Egypt, 
Babylon, or Thrace would mean the transformation of what had been mere satrapies of 
the Macedonian crown to the status of kingdoms, an alien and doubtless unacceptable 
idea. Quite apart from the matter of principle, the dynasts did not in practice confine 
their interests and aspirations to the territory directly under their control, Ptolemy serves 
as prime example. His activities since the peace of 311 had included inroads into Asia 
Minor, the capture of cities in Lycia and Caria, the extension of influence in the Aegean, 
the acquisition of holdings in the Peloponnese, an endeavor to win the hand of 
Alexander’s sister Cleopatra, and even a plan to resurrect the League of Corinth under 
his hegemony. Although most of these schemes failed of accomplishment, it is plain 
that Ptolemy’s ambitions went well beyond the mastery of Egypt. When he took the 
royal title in 304, he still retained garrisons in Corinth and Sicyon58. The overseas 
aspirations of Lysimachus and Cassander were comparably ambitious. In the ultimatum 
delivered to Antigonus in 315/4, Cassander demanded Cappadocia and Lycia, and 
Lysimachus laid claim to Hellespontine Phrygia59. Nothing suggests that they had 
modified their objectives in the interim. 
A single argument bolsters the view that the diadochoi contented themselves with 
individual kingdoms: the fact that they recognized one another’s claims by joining in 
coalition against Antigonus. But that coalition had yet to form at the time of the royal 
proclamations. Indeed, when Cassander was especially hard pressed by Antigonid 
forces as late as 302, he still lacked partners and felt compelled to open negotiations 
                                                          
“elephantarch” after Ipsus is inconclusive. Such a designation could indeed be meant to diminish his 
accomplishment at Ipsus. 
54 Plut. Demetr. 18.2: Κάσσανδρος δέ, τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸν βασιλέα καὶ γραφόντων καὶ καλούντων, αὐτός, 
ὥσπερ πρότερον εἰώθει, τὰς ἐπιστολὰς ἔγραφε. 
55 The implication, generally overlooked, is observed by ERRINGTON 1975, 250-251. 
56 See above, n. 43. 
57 WALBANK 1981, 56-57, suggests that Cassander used that title to assert a unique position not open to 
any of his rivals. But this puts too narrow a construction on the meaning of “king of the Macedonians”. 
58 It is unnecessary to detail the events here. See the summary in WILL 1966, I, 59-64. The garrisons in 
Corinth and Sicyon: Diod. 20.37.2; cf. Suidas, sv. “Demetrius”. 
59 Diod. 19.57.1; Appian, Syr. 53; Justin 15.1.2. 
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with Antigonus. Only when the latter proved obdurate did Cassander begin to assemble 
the grand Alliance that would culminate at Ipsus60. Insofar as there was mutual 
recognition in 304, it included Monophthalmus himself. The willingness of each ruler 
to use the royal title in addressing the others suffices to establish the fact61. 
The supposed contrast between two conceptions of kingship evaporates. Antigonus 
did not define his rule by the empire of Alexander, nor did his competitors define theirs 
by the boundaries of what were to become Hellenistic states. Abandonment of the 
territorial idea clears the ground for better understanding. A different perspective 
governed these monarchies. Antigonus the One-Eyed created a new form of kingship 
when he exorcised the ghosts of the Argeads and claimed legitimacy on the basis of 
personal achievement and dynastic promise. His rivals could do no less. The coronation 
of the diadochoi held a meaning that surpassed control of lands, cities, and even 
populations62. It signified an exalted prestige, an aura of power and distinction 
associated with royalty. Hence it precluded neither coalition nor competition. A 
monarchy undefined by the territorial or institutional limits allowed for both mutual 
recognition and intense rivalry. The Hellenistic kingdoms had their origins in the 
authority of the kings – not the other way round. 
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